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1 Introduction
The World Bank and other supporters of the 'free
market' approach to economic and social policy
have always had an ambiguous relationship with
the state. The package of economic reforms that the
Bank and neoliberal governments have promoted
in recent years, from privatisation of public services
to deregulation of labour and environmental laws,
has, in theory, been intended to remove the state
from all but a minimal role in the national econ-
omy Market competition, it is argued, best defines
and serves the 'public interest', because it is
through the market that individuals are best able to
express their choices; individual freedom and pros-
perity are maximised as funds are allocated effi-
ciently; people can purchase what they want at
prices determined according to supply and
demand; and wealth generated by private effort
'trickles down' to the benefit of all.
Space does not allow detailed presentation of the
case, but there is much evidence that the practical
outcome of the neoliberal agenda over the past 20
years has not, in most cases, been to diminish the
state's institutional power or spending, but rather
to redirect it (Pierson 1996: 106ff).2 The privatisa-
tion of state industries, for example, has reduced
the direct involvement of the state in the produc-
tion and distribution of many goods and services.
But the process has been accompanied by new state
regulations, subsidies and institutions aimed at
introducing and entrenching a 'favourable environ-
ment' for the newly-privatised industries. In the
process, privatisation has often reduced the
accountability of those now charged with provid-
ing services (such as water, electricity, transport,
health care and social insurance) to the public, in
particular to marginalised sections.
Moreover, 'states are still massively present in the
immediate processes of production, distribution
and exchange' (Pierson 1996:113), not least
Extracted from The Bank and the State: Dramatic U-
turn or Judicious Repackaging? available from the
Bretton Woods Project, PO Box 100, London SEl 7RT,
UK.
The most sophisticated neoliberal thinkers have always
openly acknowledged that their programme required a
'strong state' to provide a secure legal and political
framework within which business, trade and 'family life'
can prosper. For a discussion, see Held (1987: 244).
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through framing taxation policy; setting interest
rates (where independent central banks have not
been introduced) or interest rate policy; directing
subsidies to certain sectors of industry; farming out
government procurement contracts; awarding fran-
chises; setting pollution and health standards; and
funding infrastructure projects. Within those sec-
tors that remain under (albeit loosened) state con-
trol - education and health are prime examples -
new state structures have grown to train or retrain
personnel in private sector business methods, to
institute new accountancy and management tech-
niques and procedures, and to instil market disci-
pline. In the process, resources have often been
diverted from frontline service delivery and staff
morale has been undermined.
The repressive powers of many neoliberal states
have also been strengthened rather than weakened,
not least so as to respond to growing popular resis-
tance to neoliberalism. In addition, neoliberal gov-
ernments have increasingly intervened in areas of
social life which free market ideology nominally
places 'off limits'.3 In Britain, for example, opposi-
tion to Conservative free market policies led to new
legislation which increased the powers of the police
to restrict people's right to protest or to organise in
support of strike actions. In India, the security
forces have been significantly expanded in order to
deal with internal dissent and 'to facilitate domestic
capital or foreign exchange-bearing entrepreneurs'
(Kothari 1997:114) Special units of the Indian
police are now being trained by Western security
experts to 'protect the life and property of foreign
investors' (Kothari 1996). Indeed, as Smitu Kothari
of the Delhi-based human rights group Lokayan
notes, 'Business interests have increasingly become
associated with national interests . . . . One former
finance minister, echoing this spirit of policy focus,
stated recently that power should increasingly move
from the state to the boardroom' (Kothari 1996).
As British economic journalist Will Hutton records,
'the Conservatives lin Britain] sought to extend into
social life the same individualism, market-contract
dominance competition which underpinned their
economic reforms' (1997: 16). See also: Bowring (1997)
or, on the US, Sklar (1995). In Africa, too,
commentators have macle a connection between the
imposition of World Bank/International Monetary Fund
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and styles of
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2 'An Effective State' - But
Effective for Whom?
Given the central role that the state has played in
implementing neoliberal policies and its continued
involvement in regulating the minutiae of the market
economy, a direct consequence of the hand-in-glove
relationship that neoliberal governments have fos-
tered between 'adjusted' state institutions and market
interests, the fashionable free market view that states
and markets are somehow intrinsically opposed to
each other emerges as something of a myth. The 'free'
market needs the protection of states, and it needs
their powers of enforcement. The minimalist state is,
quite simply, utopian in the original sense of the
word; it exists nowhere. In that respect, the political
significance of the WDR's rejection of a minimalist
state may amount to far less than many commenta-
tors have assumed. Certainly, acknowledging any
role for the state reflects a welcome change from pre-
vious World Bank reports here the subtext seemed
to be that state was intrinsically opposed to the best
interests of society and the economy However, dis-
avowing a minimalist state that has never existed
may constitute clever political manoeuvring rather
than (as some argue) a U-turn.
At issue, therefore, is not whether modern
economies require any involvement from the state,
but to what ends and in whose interests the state
operates. The central call of WDR97 for 'an effective
state' thus inevitably raises the question: what does
the Bank mean by 'effective'? Effective for what?
Effective for whom?
Such questions are touched upon but never seri-
ously discussed in the Report. The Bank acknowl-
edges that 'different groups may hold conflicting
views about the role of the state' (p.147) but fails to
engage with those different views or to discuss their
validity Instead, the WDR adopts a tone and a lan-
guage which imply that the superiority of neoliberal
policies over other development agendas is
government which oppress citizens. Ben Turok, then
Director of the London-based Institute of African
Alternatives, noted in 1991: 'It is no coincidence that
Africa is overwhelmed by military rule at this time of
economic crisis. SAPs actually undermine the whole
structure o society, including its political structures.
SAPs can only be implemented by draconian means and
that require authoritarian, usually military government'
(1991: 9).
self-evident. Throughout the Report, 'good policies'
are equated with neoliberal policies, as if the debate
over what constitutes 'good policies' has somehow
been resolved: 'although the recipe for good policies
is well-known, too many countries still fail to take
it to heart' (Cornia in this bulletin).
WDR97 views the effectiveness of states almost
exclusively through the lens of economic efficiency
The state, says the Report, is essential for putting in
place the appropriate institutional foundations for
markets. Its existence is justified where it acts to
support private sector-led growth and unjustified
where it does not. State-owned enterprises should
therefore be privatised where possible. 'Getting the
state out of the business of providing many of the
goods and services it now provides', however, 'will
still leave it with plenty to do'. Indeed, 'the mark of
a capable state . . . is its ability to set the rules that
underpin markets and permit them to function.'
From the Banks perspective, using public money to
bolster the effectiveness and capacity of the state (as
defined by the Bank) is justified, since 'faith in gov-
ernments' ability to sustain good policies can be as
important for attracting private investment as the
content of those rules and policies' (quotations from
Cornia, in this bulletin).
One outcome of this economistic approach is that
the Report grossly oversimplifies the complex polit-
ical, social, cultural and economic landscape in
which states and markets operate. It also depoliti-
cises the debate over what constitutes an effective
state. The underlying assumption in the Report is
that what the state can or should do is a technical
question, largely independent of society
Minimal consideration is therefore given to the fun-
damental question of what institutional and other
social and economic arrangements best ensure that
the state and all levels of government are represen-
tative of collective interests and that policy is
decided in a manner that includes all citizens. On
the contrary; the Bank's sole benchmark for assess-
ing the 'effectiveness' of political processes, proce-
dures and institutions is whether or not they act as
lubricants or potential barriers to deregulation and
fiscal discipline. The Report expresses disapproval of
Uruguay's practice of holding referendums on key
issues, for example, because two recent plebiscites, in
1989 and 1992, respectively guaranteed full wage
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indexation every three months and reversed major
privatisation legislation. The Report attempts to use
economists' techniques to provide guidance on sen-
sitive political decisions advocating a 'political cost
benefit approach' which aims to assess the benefits of
reforms such as trade liberalisation by forming equa-
tions to answer the complex political question of
'how much redistribution takes place for a given
amount of efficiency gain' (WDR97: 146).
3 Locking Society Out
Nor is this surprising, for many people in the World
Bank are deeply suspicious of the public having too
much of a say in policy-making. Although the
Report emphasises the need for greater participa-
tion in decision-making in order to bring 'govern-
ment closer to the people', the Bank expressly rules
a number of key policy areas off limits to public
participation, since they 'require insulation from
political pressure' (WDR97: 117). Chief among
these is macroeconomic policy, where, the Bank
argues, 'strong, central guidance in budget and
financial matters has proved critical in ensuring
sound public finances and a reliable framework for
economic development in most industrialised
countries' (WDR97: 124).
Of particular concern to the Bank is the possibility
that participation, popular protests, elections or
similar expressions of peoples views may lead to
reforms being reversed. Whilst in the long run the
Bank advocates building up domestic institutions to
maintain policy stability and show investors that
policies will be maintained, for the near future it
argues that reforms can only be entrenched through
'international commitment mechanisms' by which
it means 'stronger ties with external actors, for
example through stabilisation programmes with the
IMF'. The Bank explains: 'To some extent, extraterri-
torial and international restraints can substitute for
limitations on the ability of national institutions to
enforce rules and to signal credibly that the rules will
remain reasonably stable over time' (WDR97: 101).
This section on the state's role in enforcing the 'rule
of law' should be clearly understood. Although
much of the Reporls discussion on this theme
concerns conventional 'law and order' issues, such
as reducing crime and corruption, it is important to
recognise that in the neoliberal canon 'Rule of Law'
does not imply that citizens should have the right to
promote legislation through their own democratic
institutions which should in turn have the author-
ity to enforce legislation. Rather, it is that the scope
of state action should be limited through lock-in
mechanisms. Thus neoliberals argue that the regu-
lations needed to ensure the proper functioning of
markets should be agreed internationally and be
enforceable through international law, for fear that
national legislators will introduce protection and
trade measures.
The Report sees international agreements as an
important means of 'strengthening commitments
not anchored by any domestic institution' (WDR97:
101). 'On the trade front, both the European Union
and the North American Free Trade Agreement
have been able to play this role,' comments the
Bank, adding that 'many countries will find it an
important reason to join the World Trade
Organisation' (WDR97: 101). A number of other
lock-in mechanisms, for example independent cen-
tral banks, are also recommended' (WDR97: 50).
4 Engineering Consent
Where the Bank sees people being involved in deci-
sion-making is in discussions on local level service
delivery, on land management, and on the planning
and implementation of individual infrastructure
projects (WDR97: 117). At this level, NGOs are
seen as a cost-effective means of delivering many of
the services currently provided by many states
(WDR97: 101).
Public involvement in defining the state's major
actions and policy directions, however, is not some-
thing the Bank seeks to encourage. Much of the dis-
cussion on participation appears to be motivated by
a perceived need to manage and contain, by con-
sultation and compensation, the backlash that
reforms may provoke from politically organised
groups. As the Bank puts it:
Evidence is mounting that government pro-
grammes work better when they seek the par-
ticipation of potential users and when they tap
the community's reservoir of social capital
rather than work against it. The benefits show
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up in smoOther implementation, greater sus-
tainability, and better feedback to government
agencies (WDR97: 11-14).
The Report does not mention or address more rad-
ical analyses which see participation as not just a
check on the power of government, but as a means
to empower marginalised groups in a way that may
enable the shifts in relations necessary to alleviate
poverty (Harper 1997).
5 Blind to Corporate Power
Underlying the Bank's analysis is a deep fear of the
'capricious' state. The text is littered with references
to the need to limit the scope for 'arbitrary action' by
officials and the need to 'cut back on their discre-
tionary authority' (WDR: 105, 120). Yet, the Report
makes little or no mention of capricious, unac-
countable or arbitrary action by the corporate sector
or of controls which could be introduced to address
the abuse of corporate power. The discussion on
corruption exemplifies the approach. Almost an
entire chapter is devoted to corruption in the public
sector, yet there is no analysis of the extent of cor-
ruption and patronage in market economies or of
the many well-documented instances of money
being used by private companies to gain political
and legal advantages in free market economies, such
as the US, UK or Malaysia.4
Indeed, when it comes to the market in general the
Bank appears power blind. Thus there is extensive
treatment of the need to prevent the 'local capture' of
state institutions by 'rent seeking' officials, but no dis-
cussion of the need to address corporations captur-
ing regulatory and legislative processes, of the means
at states' disposal to assess and address the monopoly
power of companies or of companies' use of tech-
niques as transfer pricing and offshore accounting:
Inevitably, the Bank's power-blind approach to the
market leads to exaggerated claims for its market-
led reforms. In putting the case for privatising cer-
tain health care services, for example, the Bank
argues that public funding of clinical health services
has 'entrenched social inequalities because wealth-
ier groups benefit disproportionately from hospital
care.' Most curative health care, the Bank argues, is
On patronage in Malaysia, see Bawe (1996: 229-233); and, in the UK, Weir and Hall (1996).
a (nearly) pure private good, 'if governments do not
foot the bill, all but the poorest will find ways to
care for themselves' (WDR97: 33; see also Torres
and Mathur 1996). The experience of health care
privatisation in Chile, however, suggests that this is
far from the case: inequalities of power and wealth
mean that privatisation has excluded an increasing
number of people from health care (Collins and
Lear 1995), and that, in many cases, the poor and
middle classes still end up subsidising the rich.5
The Report's section on international cooperation is
also rendered extremely superficial by its failure to
identify the key corporate and country interest
groups which are obstructing progress on issues
such as climate change prevention and realising a
peace dividend after the Cold War. On the former,
the Bank discusses the 'strong economic rationale for
adopting market-based instruments, such as trade-
able carbon emissions entitlements, to reduce green-
house gas emissions', but fails to point out that
vested interests such as oil and car companies, and
countries such as the US which consume large quan-
tities of oil, are currently obstructing any moves to
address climate change in an equitable manner. The
Bank, apparently arguing that the political playing
field is level, says that 'government willingness' is
required to create and regulate emissions entitle-
ments, but fails to point out the political and eco-
nomic obstacles to an effective agreement on this
issue, which may have far more serious social and
economic consequences than any of the other policy
failures the Bank seeks to address.
6 A Role for Intervention?
The Bank accepts that the state has a major role to
play in 'protecting the vulnerable' through social
welfare programmes, 'to ensure that the benefits of
market-led growth are shared through investments
in basic education and health.' More generally, the
Bank also acknowledges that 'market failures
continue to offer powerful economic arguments for
state intervention' (WDR97: 25).
Nonetheless, the Report's support for regulation is
at best lukewarm. Indeed, it explicitly argues
Moreover, as Public Services International, a trade
union federation, points out, 'It will surprise many
people who have benefited from public health services
to hear that the Bank regards most curative health care
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against intervention in many of the areas where reg-
ulation is perceived by critics to be most urgent, for
example on the environment. 'Government inter-
vention is not the only answer to pollution', the
Report opines. 'An expanding toolkit of innovative
and flexible incentives is now available to get pol-
luters to clean up their act. Although there is no
substitute for meaningful regulatory frameworks
and information about the environment, these new
tools, which rely on persuasion, social pressure and
market forces to help push for improved environ-
mental performance, can often succeed where regu-
lation cannot' (WDR97: 4).
The many severe difficulties with market-based
approaches to pollution control are glossed over,
leaving the impression that the 'non-regulatory'
approach is an unproblematic and realistic alterna-
tive to regulation, although the Report itself notes
that the Indonesian Clean Rivers programme, rely-
ing on voluntary codes and self-regulation by
industry, 'failed to generate any positive action by
nearly half the firms claiming to participate in it'
(WDR97: 71). Similar experiences in Europe sug-
gest that voluntary schemes have failed to encour-
age industry to strive for higher environmental
performances: rather they have degenerated into a
means whereby industries can set the standards
they are comfortable with (West: 1995).
7 Do What We Tell You
Despite the powerful evidence submitted to the
Report's team by the Japanese aid community, non-
government organisations and others on the inap-
propriateness of promoting a single, universal
approach to 'reform', the Report gives space to only
one view of what constitutes an effective market
economy and an effective state (Ohno 1997; and
Ohno and Ohno forthcoming).
The result is that the Bank's approach to reform is
only marginally less formulaic than its previous
approaches and still involves a technocratic model
for assessing what the Bank judges to be the capa-
bility of state institutions. This means that very dif-
ferent countries will be prescribed the same set of
and higher education as a "nearly pure private good" -
in other words, it is of benefit only to the people treated
or educated and not to society as a whole.' (The State of
the Bank, PSI Focus, No 3, September 1997).
reforms based on the Bank's, not citizens',
assessment of their institutions' weakness or
strength.6
Indeed, throughout the Report the Bank tells oth-
ers, particularly developing country governments,
how to assess their performance and how to per-
form better. Readers of the World Development
Report are given the impression that the World
Bank, with its huge research budget and unparal-
leled operational experience across the world, has
neutrally presented the most important evidence
and analytical tools for assessing the benefits of and
best approaches to institutional reform.
No mention is made, however, of the fact that 38
per cent of World Bank operations supporting pri-
vatisation and public sector reform are rated 'unsat-
isfactory' according to the Bank's own internal
classification. In 1996 the Bankb Private Sector
Development Department wrote a report which
found that the causes for this high failure rate 'lie as
much with Bank incentives, procedures and culture
as with conditions within the recipient country'
(World Bank 1996).
The Bank's 1997 World Development Report team,
probably because they did not want to offend their
operational colleagues in the Bank, did not address
these issues of institutional failure within the Bank
itself, not those of whether the Bank's interventions
are actually helping poor people in developing
countries, supposedly the Bank's key constituency
More fundamentally, there is also no consideration
in the report of whether the Bank is an appropriate
institution to carry out programmes to redefine the
role of the state in societies to which it is
unaccountable and in an area for which it lacks
relevant skills.
The argument that reform programmes should reflect
the strength of state institutions can also be seen as a
sophisticated way to avoid charges that poorer countries
are being denied the economic tools that helped most
richer countries get rich.
As Public Services International notes: 'In the right
hands, this Report could be the basis for putting many
governments on the defensive - especially those which
have for years been defending their anti-worker, anti-
union and pro-privatisation policies on the basis that this
is what the Bank advises them to do. The huge number
of examples which the Bank provides of how the public
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8 Scapegoats and New Roles
Given such omissions, many have questioned the
Bank's motives for raising the issue of the state so
prominently One interpretation (which some feel
overemphasises the unity within the Bank and its
ability to overcome internal policy splits) is that the
Bank wants to blame states' ineffectiveness for fail-
ures that should properly be ascribed to market-led
reforms. At the same time, it is tactically retreating
from an outright public commitment to hard-line
neoliberalism, and is seeking to ensure that its role as
a provider of NorthSouth finance and advice will be
maintained, even as the private sector is undertaking
many of the projects it used to finance. The fear is
that the Bank is seeking to carve out a new niche for
itself as arbiter of the politics as well as economics of
Southern states. This concern was clearly expressed
by authors Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli (1994:
159) following the Bank 1992 report, 'Governance
and Development':
The effect, and the intention, of structural adjust-
ment has been to weaken the state and make
sure that many of its traditional functions are
taken over by outsiders, acting on behalf of the
global market . . . . The next logical step is the
substitution of supranational for national author-
ity, under the banner of governance.
On this view, the World Development Report 1997
may plausibly be interpreted as a tentative attempt by
the Bank to carve out new roles as a supranational
authority Whether or not it succeeds will depend,
not on the strength of its theoretical models, but on
how their promotion plays out in confrontation with
active citizens. In that respect, the 1997 World
Development Report is to be welcomed - though not
perhaps for reasons which the Bank would endorse.
By revealing a chink in the neoliberal armour7, the
sector can he effective, the calls for an effective, open and
participatory state, the need for services to be designed by
and with people wherever possible, the need for adequate
resources for the state to be able to fulfil its functions, the
need for rooting Out corruption and authoritarianism, the
obvious failures of market mechanisms to meet the full
needs of people in a democratic and sustainable manner
- these things give public sector trade unions a powerful
weapon to go to governments in all kinds of countries
and say, "Even the World Bank shares many of the
demands and prescnptions which we as unions have
been putting to you for decades." ('The State of the
Bank', PSI Focus, No 3, September 1997).
Report arguably provides social movements with
new political space. More than that, the Report
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